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Abstract
We consider multiple-type housing markets. To capture the dynamic aspect of trade in such
markets, we study a dynamic recontracting process similar to the one introduced by Serrano
and Volij (2008). First, we analyze the set of recurrent classes of this process as a (non-empty)
solution concept. We show that each core allocation always constitutes a singleton recurrent
class and provide examples of non-singleton recurrent classes consisting of blocking-cycles of
individually rational allocations. For multiple-type housing markets stochastic stability never
serves as a selection device among recurrent classes.
Next, we propose a method to compute the limit invariant distribution of the dynamic re-
contracting process. Furthermore, we discuss how the limit invariant distribution is inuenced
by the relative coalitional stability and accessibility of the dierent stochastically stable allo-
cations. We illustrate our ndings with several examples. In particular, we demonstrate that
some core allocations are less likely to be nal allocations of the dynamic process than cycles
composed of non-core allocations.
Keywords: core, indivisible goods, limit invariant distribution, stochastic stability.
JEL classication: D63, D70.
1 Introduction
Dynamic recontracting processes: Consider Shapley and Scarf's (1974) well-known model of
exchange with indivisible goods, the so-called housing market model.1 One of the most important
solution concepts for such markets is the core. An allocation x is in the (strong) core if there does
not exist a coalition that can improve upon x using its own endowments: x cannot be (weakly)
blocked. The core of a housing market satises some remarkable properties. Most prominently,
if preferences are strict, the core consists of a unique allocation that also turns out to be the
unique Walrasian allocation of the market (Roth and Postlewaite, 1977). Furthermore, the core is
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1In Shapley-Scarf housing markets, each agent is endowed with a house, has preferences over the set of houses in
the market, and wishes to consume exactly one house.
1a static solution concept \with a dynamic heart": it is dened for a xed economy, but if agents
block, they cause a transition from one state of the world (an allocation) to another state of the
world (an allocation where the members of the blocking coalition are better o), which hints at
a dynamic process that however is not explicitly modeled. So the core incorporates robustness
against potential transitions in a model that does not accommodate the possibility of transition.
Our aim here is to better understand the dynamics of trade. In particular we are interested in
its resulting allocations { inside as well as outside the core. To this end, we study the following
dynamic recontracting process or d.r. process for short. The d.r. process starts with the agents'
endowments as the initial allocation for trade. Throughout the d.r. process we do not redene
endowments (property rights are not exchanged). At any stage agents can recontract upon the
allocation x that resulted from previous trades. A coalition is randomly selected and is allowed to
recontract over x if it can block x using its endowments. A new allocation is obtained as follows:
agents in the coalition reallocate their endowments according to the blocking. If this reallocation
is feasible because no agent outside the coalition was consuming the endowment of an agent in
the coalition, then agents outside the coalition stick to their assignment at x. If the coalition's
recontracting is not feasible, then agents outside the coalition receive their endowments. Thus, at
each period, a coalition is randomly selected and has the power to make the process transit from the
prevailing allocation to another one. This determines a Markov process on the set of allocations.2
In the long-run, such a Markov-process always ends up in one of its recurrent classes: a set of
allocations that once reached will never be abandoned.
To select among recurrent classes, we allow that agents make mistakes when they recontract; we
\perturb" the d.r. process. This means that in every period, each agent with a small probability 
agrees on a reallocation that makes him worse o. In such a perturbed d.r. process, any allocation
can be reached from any other allocation after a nite number of periods (with suciently many
mistakes by the agents involved). Hence, a perturbed d.r. process has only one recurrent class { the
entire set of allocations { and the probability distribution over allocations induced by the perturbed
d.r. process converges (in the long-run and for small ) to the so-called limit invariant distribution,
which is unique. The support of this distribution { the set of stochastically stable allocations { is the
set of allocations to which the perturbed d.r. process converges with strictly positive probability.
Hence, stochastically stable allocations can be regarded as the (potentially) nal allocations of the
d.r. process, and the limit invariant distribution is a probability distribution over these candidate
nal allocations.
Note that similarly as the core, recurrent classes of the unperturbed d.r. process are static.
A set of allocations is a recurrent class if it exhibits the following stability: no allocation outside
the recurrent class blocks an allocation in the recurrent class. In contrast, the limit invariant
distribution is an inherently dynamic concept as it also captures the accessibility of an allocation.
The easier it is for the d.r. process to reach an allocation { and, the more dicult to exit { the larger
is the probability that the d.r. process converges to the respective allocation in the long run. Hence,
the limit invariant distribution is a probability distribution over nal allocations that combines a
core-like stability concept (each stochastically stable allocation is an element of a recurrent class)
with a notion of accessibility incorporated by the d.r. process.
One of our objectives is a computational method that elicits the set of stochastically stable
allocations and the limit invariant distribution. In particular, we are interested in the relation
2We discuss basic notions of Markov processes in Appendix B.
2between the set of nal allocations of d.r. processes (and the respective probability distributions) and
the core. This is the main reason why we have modeled the d.r. process using recontracting based
on core blocking and without the transfer of property rights (once property rights are transferred
throughout the process, it is obvious that the core of the initial market will not play any specic
role). Given that we model the d.r. process as closely as possible to the implicit dynamic elements
incorporated into the core, we ask the following questions: Are core allocations necessarily elements
of recurrent classes and stochastically stable? Does the process converge to every core allocation
with the same probability? Can the process converge to non-core allocations?
Relation to the Literature: Pioneering work on d.r. processes for exchange economies has
been conducted by Feldman (1974) and Green (1974).3 They provide conditions for which a d.r.
process converges to the core and thereby formalize Edgeworth's intuition that the nal allocation
of an exchange economy can be reached through dynamic recontracting. In a recent contribution,
Serrano and Volij (2008) use d.r. processes to analyze Shapley-Scarf housing markets. One of
their results (Serrano and Volij, 2008, Proposition 3) uses a Markov process identical to the one
described above: for housing markets with strict preferences, the unique core allocation is the
unique recurrent class (and, hence, the unique stochastically stable allocation) of the d.r. process.
This \equivalence" result between the core and the set of nal allocations of the d.r. process is
driven by the global dominance property of the core for housing markets with strict preferences.
Furthermore, Serrano and Volij (2008) consider housing markets with weak preferences and Markov
processes based on strong as well as on weak blocking. Since in our model we use weak blocking,
here we restrict attention to Serrano and Volij's (2008, Section 3) results using the weak blocking
dynamics. Serrano and Volij (2008) characterize the set of recurrent classes and obtain various
results on the structure of stochastically stable allocations. In particular, they show that every
allocation in the core forms a singleton recurrent class of the d.r. process (Serrano and Volij, 2008,
Propositions 2). However, not every core or Walrasian allocation needs to be stochastically stable
(Serrano and Volij, 2008, Example 6) and the set of stochastically stable allocations might contain
cycles of non-Walrasian allocations (Serrano and Volij, 2008, Example 7). These results suggest
that the set of stochastically stable allocations is a dynamic solution concept that relates to the
core and the set of Walrasian allocations in a non-trivial way.
Our Contribution: We consider multiple-type housing markets with strict preferences (Moulin,
1995). Hence, we endow each agent with one commodity of each type (e.g., houses and cars or, more
realistically, tutor groups for dierent courses as described in Klaus, 2008) and analyze simultaneous
trade in all these types. Konishi, Quint, and Wako (2001) show that the core of such an economy
may well be empty or multi-valued.4 For the case of only one type, our model is identical to Serrano
and Volij's (2008) benchmark model with strict preferences.
Similar to Serrano and Volij (2008), for the dynamic process based on weak blocking, we show
that each allocation in the core forms a singleton recurrent classes of the d.r. process while there are
possibly non-singleton recurrent classes consisting of blocking cycles. In contrast to Serrano and
Volij's ndings { and to many applications of Markov processes (see for example the literature on
equilibrium selection in non-cooperative games as proposed by Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993)
{ we show that stochastic stability does not serve as a selection device among recurrent classes.
3See also Neuefeind (1974) for a generalization of Green's (1974) results. While both Feldman (1974) and Green
(1974) deal with an innite state space, our model induces a nite state space, and hence a nite Markov process.
For seminal contributions using nite Markov processes, see Kalai et al. (1976) and Shenoy (1979).
4We show that the same holds for the set of Walrasian allocations.
3There is no recurrent class of the d.r. process that fails to be stochastically stable. If we base
the d.r. process on strong instead of weak blocking or employ a dierent convention for the set of
allocations that can result from a blocking than the convention used here or by Serrano and Volij
(2008), some recurrent classes might fail to be stochastically stable. For all dynamic processes that
we discuss, not every stochastically stable allocation (each allocation in the support of the limit
invariant distribution) will be the nal allocation of the process with the same probability.
Starting with a result by Freidlin and Wentzell (1998), we develop a method to compute the
limit invariant distribution of a d.r. process. As the limit invariant distribution is a probability
distribution over stochastically stable recurrent classes, its use is to discriminate between the dif-
ferent stochastically stable allocations as contenders for the nal allocations of the economy. This
discrimination hinges on one crucial conceptual dierence between what determines the stochastic
stability of an allocation and what determines the probability that this allocation will be the nal
allocation of the process. While stochastic stability depends on the minimum number of mistakes
needed to reach and leave a certain allocation, the probability assigned by the limit invariant distri-
bution is also determined by the probabilities of the original d.r. process to reach and leave a certain
allocation. This additional dependence on the underlying d.r. process allows for a ner characteri-
zation of its nal allocations. In particular, we show that some core and Walrasian allocations may
be the least likely of all possible nal allocations. On the other hand, blocking-cycles may emerge
as powerful contenders for nal allocations even if the core is non-empty. Hence, following the
long-run predictions of a d.r. process leads us to a better understanding of the non-trivial relation
between core allocations, Walrasian allocations, and blocking-cycles.
Moreover, we regard our analysis of d.r. processes as an instructive illustration of a method
to assess the limit invariant distribution. This method should be useful in many applications of
Markov processes such as equilibrium selection in non-cooperative games (Agastya, 2004; Binmore
et al., 2003; Kandori et al., 1993) or models of network formation (Jackson and Watts, 2002).
Organization of the Paper: The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we dene multiple-type housing markets. In Section 3, we discuss some basic results for multiple-
type housing markets and introduce examples. In Section 4, we introduce the d.r. process and
characterize its recurrent classes. In Section 5, we continue with the perturbed d.r. process and
study stochastic stability and the limit invariant distribution. Finally, Section 6 concludes with
some remarks on the relation between the dierent solution concepts.
2 Multiple-Type Housing Markets: the Model
Let N = f1;:::;ng, n  2, be the set of agents, which we sometimes call the grand coalition. There
exist  `  1 types of indivisible objects. The set of object types is denoted by L = f1;:::;  `g and
each agent i 2 N is endowed with one object of each type ` 2 L, denoted by i. Thus, N also
denotes the set of objects of each type.
Allocations: An allocation is an assignment of objects such that each agent receives exactly one
object of each type, i.e., an allocation is a matrix x = (xi(`))i2N;`2L 2 NNL such that
(i) For each i 2 N and each ` 2 L, xi(`) 2 N denotes the object of type ` that agent i consumes,
e.g., if xi(`) = j, then agent i receives agent j's endowment of type `, and
(ii) no object of any type is assigned to more than one agent, i.e., for each ` 2 L, [i2Nfxi(`)g = N:
4Let X denote the set of allocations. Given x 2 X and ` 2 L, x(`) = (x1(`);:::;xn(`)) denotes
the allocation of type-` objects. Given x 2 X and i 2 N, xi = (xi(1);:::;xi( `)) denotes the
list of objects that agent i receives at allocation x. We call xi agent i's bundle. Note that the
set of bundles for each i 2 N can be denoted by NL. We denote each agent i's endowment by
ei = (i;:::;i) 2 NL. Similarly, for any coalition S  N, we denote coalition S's endowment by
eS = (ei)i2S.
Markets: Each agent i 2 N has complete, transitive, and strict preferences Ri over bundles, i.e.,
Ri is a linear order over NL. We denote the strict part of Ri by Pi. Thus, for bundles xi;yi 2 NL,
xi Ri yi implies [xi 6= yi and xi Pi yi] or [xi = yi]. By R we denote the set of preferences over
NL. By RN = i2NR we denote the set of (preference) proles. Since the set of agents and their
endowments remain xed throughout, RN also denotes the set of multiple-type housing markets.
For  ` = 1, our model coincides with the classical Shapley and Scarf (1974) housing market model.5
Individual Rationality: An allocation x is individually rational for R 2 RN if for each i 2 N,
xi Ri ei. Let IR(R) be the set of individually rational allocations for R 2 RN:
To introduce the standard (cooperative) solution concepts for multiple-type housing markets we
need some additional notation. The set of all feasible reallocations of objects among the members
of coalition S  N is denoted by,
XS = f(xi(`))i2S;`2L 2 NSL j for each ` 2 L; [i2Sfxi(`)g = Sg:
Let y 2 X and S  N. Then, by yS = (yi)i2S we denote the restriction of allocation y to
coalition S. For notational convenience we will also use X S  XNnS and y S  yNnS.
If for R 2 RN, x;y 2 X, and S  N, (i) yS 2 XS, (ii) for each i 2 S, yi Ri xi, and (iii) for some
j 2 S, yj Pj xj, then y S-blocks x.6
The Core: An allocation x 2 X is a core allocation for R 2 RN if there exists no coalition S  N
and no yS 2 XS such that y S-blocks x. Let Core(R) be the set of core allocations { the core {
for R 2 RN.
The core dened by weak blocking is often referred to as the strong or strict core (e.g., Konishi
et al., 2001). In contrast, the core dened by strong blocking is often referred to as the weak core.
Throughout this paper, we refer to the strong core as the core.
Walrasian Allocations: Dene a price system by p  (p`)`2L 2 Rn `
+ such that for all l 2 L,
p` = (p`(1);:::;p`(n)) 2 Rn
+. An allocation x is a Walrasian allocation for R 2 RN if there
exists a price system p 2 Rn `









`2L p`(i):7 Let W(R)
be the set of Walrasian allocations { the Walrasian set { for R 2 RN.
3 Multiple-Type Housing Markets: Basic Results & Examples
First, we summarize some results for the benchmark case of one object type housing markets.
5Note that instead of considering the whole domain of linear orders R as our reference domain, we could restrict
the domain to the domain of separable preferences R
s (see Klaus, 2008) or to the domain of additively separable
preferences R
as (see Konishi et al., 2001). However, separability plays no role in our analysis.
6This denition of blocking is usually referred to as weak blocking or weak domination (e.g., Roth and Postlewaite,
1977). In contrast, y is a strong S-blocking of x if (i) yS 2 XS and (ii) for each i 2 S, yi Pi xi.
7Note that the budget inequality (i) can be replaced by a budget equality: this can be easily checked by adding













5Remark 1. The Benchmark Case: Housing Markets with Strict Preferences
For any housing market with one object type (and strict preferences) a core allocation always exists
(Shapley and Scarf, 1974). Furthermore, the core equals the Walrasian set and is a singleton (Roth
and Postlewaite, 1977). Using the so-called top-trading algorithm (due to David Gale, see Shapley
and Scarf, 1974) one can easily calculate the unique core allocation for any housing market with
one object type. Furthermore, the core is externally stable, i.e., for any non-core allocation x there
exists a coalition S such that the core allocation S-blocks x (Roth and Postlewaite, 1977). Serrano
and Volij (2008) refer to this particular feature of the core as \global dominance." 4
As soon as we either relax the assumption of strict preferences or increase the number of object
types, existence, single-valuedness, and the global dominance property of the core fail. For markets
with  `  2, the core may be empty or multi-valued { even for additively separable preferences
(Konishi et al., 2001). Moreover, for each R 2 RN, W(R)  Core(R) (Konishi et al., 2001,
Proposition 3.1).
We next introduce several examples that we will analyze in the sequel.8 All our examples are
multiple-type housing market with two object types and three agents.




The set IR(R) of individually rational allocations is fx1;x2;x3;x4g, with
x1 = f(1;1);(2;2);(3;3)g, x2 = f(1;1);(3;2);(2;3)g, x3 = f(1;2);(2;1);(3;3)g,
x4 = f(3;1);(2;2);(1;3)g.
Clearly, x2 f2;3g-blocks x1, x3 f1;2g-blocks x2, x4 f1;3g-blocks x3, and x2 f2;3g-blocks x4. Hence,
Core(R) = W(R) = ;. 
We relegate the computation of the core and the Walrasian set for all remaining examples to
Appendix A.
Example 2. The Unique Walrasian Allocation Equals the Core Allocation




The set IR(R) of individually rational allocations is fx1;x2;x3;x4;x5g, with
x1 = f(1;1);(2;2);(3;3)g, x2 = f(1;1);(3;2);(2;3)g, x3 = f(1;2);(2;1);(3;3)g,
x4 = f(3;1);(2;2);(1;3)g, x5 = f(2;2);(3;3);(1;1)g.
Furthermore, Core(R) = W(R) = fx5g: 
8The exception is Example 5, which we comment on in Remark 2.
6The next example has multiple core allocations, of which only one is Walrasian.9
Example 3. Multiple Core Allocations and a Unique Walrasian Allocation




The set IR(R) of individually rational allocations is fx1;x2;x3;x4g, with
x1 = f(1;1);(2;2);(3;3)g, x2 = f(2;3);(1;2);(3;1)g, x3 = f(1;2);(3;3);(2;1)g,
x4 = f(3;3);(1;2);(2;1)g.
Furthermore, W(R) = fx3g   fx2;x3;x4g = Core(R). 
Next we illustrate that the Walrasian set may contain multiple allocations.




The set IR(R) of individually rational allocations is fx1;x2;x3;x4g, with
x1 = f(1;1);(2;2);(3;3)g, x2 = f(2;3);(1;2);(3;1)g; x3 = f(3;3);(1;2);(2;1)g,
x4 = f(1;2);(3;3);(2;1)g:
Furthermore, W(R) = Core(R) = fx3;x4g. 
In our last example the Walrasian set is empty while the core is nonempty.




The set IR(R) of individually rational allocations is fx1;x2;x3;x4;x5g, with
x1 = f(1;1);(2;2);(3;3)g, x2 = f(1;1);(3;2);(2;3)g, x3 = f(2;3);(1;2);(3;1)g,
x4 = f(3;3);(1;2);(2;1)g, x5 = f(1;2);(3;3);(2;1)g.
Furthermore, W(R) = ;   fx2;x3g = Core(R). 
9Since in our context, separability does not play a role, we introduce alternative examples to the ones analyzed in
Konishi et al. (2001); for instance, Example 3 has four individually rational allocations while Konishi et al.'s (2001)
corresponding example has eleven individually rational allocations.
7The last two examples illustrate two features of the relationship between the core and the
Walrasian set not yet recognized in the literature.
Remark 2. New Insights on Walrasian Allocations through Examples 4 and 5
Konishi et al. (2001) prove that the Walrasian set is a subset of the core and that it might be empty
if the core is also empty. Example 5 shows that the Walrasian set might even be empty when the
core is nonempty. Second, in Example 4 the Walrasian set contains more than one allocation. 4
Moreover, the examples collected in this section demonstrate that the core, or the Walrasian
set, are not necessarily satisfactory solutions for multiple-type housing markets.
Remark 3. Core/Walrasian Allocations as Solutions?
First, note that both standard static solution sets, the core and the Walrasian set, may be empty.
When they are, we do not have any (static) prediction to oer as to what will happen. Will agents
keep their endowments or will they trade? Second, the core and the Walrasian set may be multi-
valued. When they are, again we cannot make (static) predictions which, if any, of the possible
allocations in the core will result from trade. As discussed in the Introduction, we will explicitly
model the dynamic aspect of the core through a dynamic recontracting process. Doing so will
enable us to say more about core and Walrasian allocations as solutions of dynamic trade. 4
Next, we model the dynamic recontracting process and characterize market outcomes via the
respective set of recurrent classes (Section 4), stochastic stability (Section 5.1), and { last but not
least { the limit invariant distribution (Section 5.2).
4 Unperturbed Dynamic Recontracting Processes
For each R 2 RN, dynamic recontracting is modeled by a Markov Process (X;M(R)).?? The state
space is the set of allocations X and M(R) is a transition matrix that describes the following
dynamics. In each period t, the process is at an allocation x(t) 2 X and a coalition S of agents
is randomly selected. The process moves from x(t) to another allocation x(t + 1) when the agents
in S recontract among themselves, i.e., agree upon a redistribution of their endowments. Agents
recontract if they benet from doing so by means of blocking { they don't make mistakes. As we
will allow for mistakes or perturbations later on, we refer to the dynamic recontracting process
discussed in this section as unperturbed. The following three assumptions are satised in each
period.
Assumption 1. Opportunities to Recontract
Each coalition S  N is chosen with positive probability to recontract. A coalition that has this
opportunity is an active coalition.
This rather mild assumption covers most of the common models of coalition formation. In
particular, the probability with which a certain coalition has the opportunity to recontract can
depend on the size of the coalition, the allocation in period t, or the identities of the agents involved
as long as the corresponding probability distribution has full support in the set of coalitions.
For each S  N and each x 2 X, let BS(x) = fyS 2 XS j for each i 2 S; yi Ri
xi and for some j 2 S; yj Pj xjg be the set of S-blockings of x.
8Assumption 2. Recontracting Behavior
Given x(t), an active coalition S  N recontracts if BS(x(t)) 6= ;. If jBS(x(t))j > 1, then each
yS 2 BS(x(t)) is chosen with positive probability.
Agents are myopic in the sense that they agree upon a reallocation of their endowments if it is
weakly improving in the subsequent period, even though they might be worse o later.
The assumption according to which weakly improving reallocations are chosen is again mild. It
is only important that any such reallocation is chosen with positive probability. The probability
itself can depend on the identities or even the preferences of the agents in the active coalition.
We now x the allocation that results from recontracting.
Assumption 3. Allocations Resulting from Recontracting
Let S be the active coalition in period t. If BS(x(t)) = ;, then x(t + 1) = x(t). Let yS 2 BS(x(t))
be the blocking chosen by S. If x S(t) 2 X S, then x(t + 1) = (yS;x S(t)), and otherwise,
x(t + 1) = (yS;eS).
A Markov process (X;M(R)) that satises Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 is an unperturbed dynamic
recontracting process, or u.d.r. process for short. Serrano and Volij (2008, Section 7) consider this
specication of the u.d.r. process for Shapley-Scarf economies ( ` = 1).
An important solution for the u.d.r. process is the set of recurrent classes. A set A  X is a
recurrent class if it is a minimal set of allocations that once entered throughout the u.d.r. process
is never left.
Let R 2 RN. We denote the set of recurrent sets by RS(R) = fA  X j for each x 2
A and each x0 = 2 A; M(R)(x;x0) = 0g. The set of recurrent classes RC(R) is the set of all minimal
recurrent sets. Notice that RC(R) is a set of sets of allocations. It is convenient to also denote the
set of recurrent allocations by RC(R) = fx 2 X j there exists A 2 RC(R) with x 2 Ag.
Theorem 1. Recurrent Classes
Let R 2 RN and (X;M(R)) be an u.d.r. process. Then,
(i) RC(R) 6= ;.
(ii) fxg 2 RC(R) , x 2 Core(R).
(iii) W(R)  Core(R)  RC(R)  IR(R).10
Proof. Statement (i) follows from the niteness of the Markov process (the niteness of X).
Statement (ii) is a direct implication of the denition of the u.d.r. process and the fact that a
core allocation cannot be blocked by any other allocation.
Statement (iii): W(R)  Core(R) follows from Konishi et al. (2001, Proposition 3.1). Statement
(ii) implies Core(R)  RC(R). Note that, by the denition of the u.d.r. process, in each period t,
x(t) 2 IR(R). Hence, RC(R)  IR(R).
Theorem 1 shows that the set of recurrent allocations of an u.d.r. process deserves attention
as a solution for multiple-type housing markets: for any multiple-type housing market the set of
recurrent allocations is non-empty, consists only of individually rational allocations, and contains all
core allocations. To demonstrate (i) the non-emptiness of RC(R), (ii) the coexistence of singleton
10Example 2 is a multiple-type housing market with Core(R) ( RC(R) ( IR(R) and Example 3 is a multiple-type
housing market with W(R) ( Core(R).
9recurrent classes (i.e., allocations in the core) and non-singleton recurrent classes, and (iii) the
absence of selection between core allocations, we continue with three of the examples introduced
in Section 3.11
In Example 1 we observe a multi-valued (non-core) recurrent class.
Example 1 (continued). Empty Core and Non-Singleton Recurrent Class
Recall that Core(R) = ;: By Theorem 1(iii), only allocations in IR(R) = fx1;x2;x3;x4g can be
recurrent allocations. Since x1 can be blocked by any other allocation in IR(R), it can never be an
element of a recurrent class. Hence, we are left with x2;x3, and x4. Recall that we have a blocking
cycle where x3 f1;2g-blocks x2, x4 f1;3g-blocks x3, and x2 f2;3g-blocks x4. Thus, none of x2, x3,
and x4 can form a singleton recurrent class. Furthermore, each of these allocations can be reached
from one another through (a sequence of) blocking(s) while once one of these allocations is reached
no outside allocation can block. Therefore, fx2;x3;x4g constitutes the only recurrent class. Hence,
RC(R) = ffx2;x3;x4gg and RC(R) = fx2;x3;x4g. 
In Example 2 we have two recurrent classes (one of them equals the core and contains the unique
Walrasian allocation, the other contains three non-core allocations).
Example 2 (continued). The Set of Recurrent Classes Exceeds the Core
Recall that Core(R) = fx5g: By Theorem 1(iii), only allocations in IR(R) = fx1;x2;x3;x4;x5g
can be recurrent allocations. By Theorem 1(ii), Core(R) = fx5g is the only singleton recurrent
class. Next, recall that the only dierence between Examples 1 and 2 is that { loosely speaking {
we added allocation x5 to the agents' preferences such that x5 is now not only individually rational,
but also the unique core allocation. However, none of x2, x3, or x4 can be blocked by x5 (or
x1) while there is again the blocking cycle where x3 f1;2g-blocks x2, x4 f1;3g-blocks x3, and x2
f2;3g-blocks x4. Thus, fx2;x3;x4g forms (as in Example 1) the only non-singleton recurrent class.
Hence, RC(R) = ffx2;x3;x4g;fx5gg and RC(R) = fx2;x3;x4;x5g. 
We conclude with a multiple-type housing market where the set of recurrent classes coincides
with the set of core allocations.
Example 3 (continued). The Core Equals the Set of Recurrent Classes
Recall that Core(R) = fx2;x3;x4g: By Theorem 1(iii), only allocations in IR(R) = fx1;x2;x3;x4g
can be recurrent allocations. Since x1 can be blocked by any other allocation in IR(R), it can never
be an element of a recurrent class. With Theorem 1(ii), fx2g, fx3g and fx4g are the only recurrent
classes. Hence, RC(R) = ffx2g;fx3g;fx4gg and RC(R) = Core(R). 
To summarize, even in the case of an empty core, RC(R) oers a prediction for the outcome
of a multiple-type housing market (Example 1). This, however, is achieved at the expense of a
weakly larger set of nal outcomes whenever the core is non-empty (Example 2). Note that this
closely resembles the situation in the literature on evolutionary selection of Nash equilibria in, e.g.,
coordination games (Young, 1993): while every Nash equilibrium of the coordination game is also a
singleton recurrent class of the unperturbed learning process, the set of recurrent classes typically
exceeds the set of Nash equilibria.
11The recurrent classes of the other examples are determined in Appendix A.
105 Perturbed Dynamic Recontracting Processes
We will now perturb the dynamic recontracting process by allowing agents to make mistakes, i.e.,
an agent might agree on a reallocation that makes him worse o. We follow the standard approach
by assuming that in any given period, any agent in an active coalition can make a mistake with
probability  > 0. We restrict perturbations to mistakes where agents agree on individually rational
allocations that make them worse o.12 One could argue that any active coalition knows that an
individually irrational block is never sustainable because an agent who receives a bundle that is
worse than his endowment later (with positive probability) is allowed to recontract with himself
and then has the good sense to improve on his bundle by enforcing his endowment.
From now on we assume that the state space for any R 2 R equals the set of individually
rational allocations, i.e., X = IR(R).
Assumption 4. Mistakes
The probability with which a member of an active coalition i 2 S agrees on a reallocation yS with
xi(t) Pi yi Ri ei equals  > 0.
In particular, the probability of a mistake does not depend on the active coalition, the given
x(t), or agents' preferences. A Markov process (X;M(R)) that satises Assumptions 1 { 4 is a
perturbed dynamic recontracting process, or p.d.r. process for short. The p.d.r. process is ergodic:
as mistakes induce (indirect) transitions between any two allocations its unique recurrent class is
the entire state space X = IR(R) (i.e., the p.d.r. process is irreducible). Then, the p.d.r. process
exhibits a unique invariant distribution (R) { for notational convenience from now on simply  {
with support IR(R) that displays the long-run probability distribution over allocations (i.e., for any
x 2 X, (x) is the probability that the process will be at allocation x in the long-run). Moreover,
the perturbation is regular on IR(R), i.e., transition probabilities between any two individually
rational allocations are non-zero and polynomials in . As every transition from an allocation x0
to an allocation x00 can involve a maximum of n mistakes (by every agent in N) we can denote
M(R)(x0;x00) 
P
k=0;:::;n mk(x0;x00)k where mk(x0;x00) captures the probability that a coalition
forms at allocation x0 and agrees upon allocation x00 with exactly k agents making a mistake. In
particular, m0(x0;x00) = M(R)(x0;x00) (the intercept of the polynomial) is the respective entry in
the transition matrix of the u.d.r. process.
The limit invariant distribution  of a Markov process (X;M(R)) is the (unique) invariant
distribution  of a perturbed process (X;M(R)) in the limit of  ! 0 (i.e.,   lim!0 ).
Hence, (x) depicts the probability that the process will be at allocation x in the long-run and
in the limit of vanishing mistakes. Young (1993, Theorem 4(i)) shows that the limit invariant
distribution exists and that it is an invariant distribution of the u.d.r. process (X;M(R)) if the
perturbation is regular (i.e., if Assumption 4 holds). The support of every invariant distribution
of the unperturbed process is a (non-empty) collection of its recurrent classes. Allocations in the
support of  are called stochastically stable. Hence, if an allocation x is stochastically stable, the
p.d.r. process will be at x in the long run and in the limit of vanishing mistakes with strictly positive
probability (i.e., (x) > 0). We denote the set of stochastically stable allocations by SRC(R).
We rst explore stochastic stability for our d.r. processes.
12The consequences of also allowing \individually irrational mistakes" would be a more cumbersome analysis of the
examples in Subsection 5.2. Preferences would have to be specied over all bundles (also the individually irrational
ones) and taken into account in the construction of least resistance trees (see Subsection 5.2). However, it is easy to
see that the general results described in Theorems 2 and 3 still hold.
115.1 Stochastic Stability
Lemma 1. Young (1993, Theorem4(i)) Let R 2 RN and (X;M(R)) be an u.d.r. process.
Then,
SRC(R) 6= ; and SRC(R)  RC(R):
Next, for each R 2 R, we introduce a general methodology to determine the set of stochastically
stable allocations SRC(R) and apply it to our examples.
x-Trees: Consider the set of directed graphs that have vertex set X = IR(R). Then, any directed
graph is dened by its set of directed edges. We denote a directed edge from x0 to x00 by [x0;x00] and
interpret it as x00 is the outcome of recontracting that started from x0. Note that the irreducibility
of the p.d.r. process implies that for any directed edge [x0;x00] we have that M(R)(x0;x00) > 0. An
x-tree Tx (or a spanning tree) is a directed graph such that for every y 2 X with y 6= x there is
exactly one (cycle-free) sequence of edges (a directed path) from y to x. Denote by Tx the set of
all x-trees.
Stochastic Potential: Let [x0;x00] be an edge in an x-tree Tx 2 Tx. The edge-resistance r(x0;x00)
is the minimum number of mistakes needed to get directly from x0 to x00, i.e., the minimal num-
ber of agents that are worse o through recontracting when actively participating in a block-
ing of allocation x0 that results in allocation x00. Formally, r(x0;x00) = minfr  0 j 1 >
lim!0  rM(R)(x0;x00) > 0g. Finally, the stochastic potential of x 2 X, denoted by (x), is
the minimal sum of edge-resistances over all x-trees, i.e., (x) = minTx2Tx
P
[x0;x00]2Tx r(x0;x00). An
x-tree e Tx that minimizes
P
[x0;x00]2Tx r(x0;x00) is a least resistance x-tree.
Stochastic Stability: An allocation x is stochastically stable if and only if it minimizes the
stochastic potential (x). The set of stochastically stable allocations SRC(R) can be characterized
as follows.
Lemma 2. Young (1993, Theorem4(ii)) Let R 2 RN and (X;M(R)) be an u.d.r. process.
Then, allocation x 2 X is stochastically stable if and only if for all y 2 X, (x)  (y).
Interpretation and Basic Implications: The set of recurrent classes of a dynamic recontract-
ing process are internally stable because no allocation in a recurrent class can be blocked by an
\outside allocation". In the case of singleton recurrent classes this internal stability requirement
coincides with the (internal) stability of the core. Stochastic stability also requires internal stability
{ SRC(R)  RC(R) { but in addition also considers the relative accessibility of recurrent classes,
i.e., the number of mistakes agents need to make in order to reach a recurrent class from all other
allocations. This notion of accessibility is captured by the stochastic potential. By also imposing
a measure of accessibility, stochastic stability might serve as a selection device among recurrent
classes and among core allocations.
Note that allocations in the same recurrent class have the same stochastic potential. To see
this consider two allocations x and y in the same recurrent class. Now take any least resistance
x-tree e Tx. Obviously, there exists a path from y to x consisting solely of edges with zero resistance,
and such a path has to be part of e Tx (otherwise e Tx would not be a least resistance tree). Likewise,
there also exists a path from x to y consisting solely of edges with zero resistance. But then
we can construct a y-tree e Ty with
P
[x0;x00]2e Tx r(x0;x00) =
P
[x0;x00]2e Ty r(x0;x00) which implies that
(x)  (y). Graphically one can obtain the y-tree e Ty by rst drawing the zero resistance path
from x to y and then attaching the missing vertices by using only branches of e Tx { thus e Ty is
12obtained from e Tx by \tree surgery". As the argument to obtain (x)  (y) is symmetric with
respect to x and y, it follows that (x) = (y). Because of the identity of stochastic potentials
within a given recurrent class, we simply refer to (x) as the stochastic potential of the recurrent
class that includes x.
Observe, however, that the stochastic potential is only determined by the resistance of a tree
in the set of least resistance trees. Consider, for instance, R 2 R with RC(R) = ffxg;fygg. To
establish stochastic stability of fxg, we only have to nd one x-tree with tree-resistance (y). The
number of least resistance trees for either fxg or fyg does not inuence the result. This already
suggests that the stochastic potential does not capture all aspects of accessibility and stability of
allocations. We return to this observation in Subsection 5.2.
Computation: Let R 2 RN. Lemma 2 oers the following procedure to compute SRC(R).
1. Determine the set of recurrent classes RC(R).
2. Let A 2 RC(R) and x 2 A. Construct a least resistance x-tree and compute (x). For every
y 2 A, set (y) = (x).
3. Determine SRC(R) = fx 2 RC(R) j for all y 2 RC(R); (x)  (y)g.
To illustrate our methodology, we apply it to the examples discussed in Section 4.
Example 1 (continued). Empty Core and Non-Singleton SRC(R)
Recall that RC(R) = ffx2;x3;x4gg. Hence by Lemmas 1 and 2, and the observation that allocations




The following examples illustrate how to compute the stochastic potential.
Example 2 (continued). SRC(R) = RC(R) ! Core(R)
Recall that RC(R) = ffx2;x3;x4g;fx5gg. All allocations in fx2;x3;x4g have the same stochas-
tic potential. Hence, it is sucient to construct a least resistance x2-tree. Note that x2 can
be reached from x1, x3, and x4 without mistakes. Thus, we only have to link up x5 with
a minimal number of mistakes. Every allocation in fx2;x3;x4g can be reached from x5 with
one mistake, e.g., f2;3g can recontract to obtain x2 with a mistake by agent 2. Therefore
e Tx2 = f[x1;x2];[x4;x2];[x3;x4];[x5;x2]g is a least resistance x2-tree and (x2) = (x3) = (x4) = 1.
The grand coalition can recontract at any of the allocations x2, x3, or x4 to reach x5 with one
mistake, e.g., starting from x2 the grand coalition can recontract to obtain x5 with a mistake by
agent 3. Note that x2 can be reached from x1, x3, and x4 without mistakes. Therefore e Tx5 =
f[x4;x2];[x3;x4];[x2;x5];[x1;x2]g is a least resistance x5-tree and (x5) = 1. Thus, SRC(R) = 
x5;x2;x3;x4	
= RC(R). 
Example 3 (continued). SRC(R) = RC(R) = Core(R) and jCore(R)j > 1
Recall that RC(R) = ffx2g;fx3g;fx4gg. From any of the core allocations, each single agent
can recontract with himself to obtain x1 by making one mistake. Note that any core allocation
can be reached from x1 without mistakes. Therefore, e Tx2 = f[x1;x2];[x3;x1];[x4;x1]g, e Tx3 =
f[x1;x3];[x2;x1];[x4;x1]g, and e Tx4 = f[x1;x4];[x2;x1];[x3;x1]g are least resistance trees, (x2) =




The last example nicely illustrates a weakness of stochastic stability as a selection device for
recurrent classes. Observe that a direct transition from x2 to x3 needs two mistakes while all
other direct transitions between core allocations only ask for one mistake. This indicates that x2
is more dicult to exit for the p.d.r. process than other core allocations, and x3 is more dicult
13to access. This suggests x2 as a more accessible and more stable allocation, or simply a better
prediction for the nal allocation. But due to the indirect paths from one recurrent class via x1
to another recurrent class, all core allocations have a stochastic potential of 2 and the conjectured
\superiority" of x2 can not be established.
Theorem 2. Stochastic Stability and Recurrent Classes
Let R 2 RN and (X;M(R)) be an u.d.r. process. Then,
(i) for all x 2 RC(R), (x) = jRC(R)j   1 and
(ii) RC(R) = SRC(R).
We rst prove the following auxiliary result.
Claim 1. For all x;x0 2 IR(R), x 6= x0, there is a path from x to x0 with at most one mistake.
Proof of Claim 1. We distinguish three cases. First, suppose that x = e. Since x0 is individually
rational, r(x;x0) = 0. Second, suppose that x0 = e. Then, x 6= e and for at least one agent i 2 N,
xi 6= ei. When the singleton coalition fig forms, agent i can claim back his endowment, which
requires at most one mistake (by agent i). Since xNnfig is no longer feasible, all agents in Nnfig
receive their endowments. Hence, r(x;x0)  1. Third, suppose x 6= e and x0 6= e. Then the previous
ndings imply that the sequence of edges [x;e];[e;x0] constitutes a path with r(x;e) + r(e;x0)  1,
which concludes the proof of the claim. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Using Claim 1, it is now easy to construct least-resistance trees.
Let R 2 R and denote the respective (nite) set of recurrent classes by RC(R) = fA1;:::;Amg.
It follows from the denition of a recurrent class that for all x 2 X, (x)  m   1. Next, we prove
that for all x 2 RC(R), (x)  m   1.
For any allocation x 2 RC(R), we construct an x-tree as follows. Consider rst the recurrent
class Ak with x 2 Ak. By the denition of a recurrent class, for all x0 2 Ak, r(x0;x) = 0, i.e.,
there exists a set of edges that constitute the restriction of an x-tree to Ak without mistakes.
Suppose that all x0 2 Ak are connected through that set of edges. Then pick another recurrent
class Al 6= Ak and consider an allocation y 2 Al. Again, by the denition of a recurrent class, for
all y0 2 Al, r(y0;y) = 0 and there exists the restriction of a y-tree to Al without mistakes. Suppose
that all y0 2 Al are connected through that set of edges. By Claim 1, r(y;x)  1. Hence, we
can connect Ak and Al with at most one mistake. So far we have constructed a \partial x-tree"
that connects all allocations in Ak [ Al with at most one mistake. Repeat this procedure for all
remaining recurrent classes. In each step a new recurrent class is connected to the existing partial
x-tree with at most one mistake. Hence, we can construct a complete x-tree with at most m   1
mistakes. Thus, (x) = m   1, which proves Statement (i). Statement (i) and Lemma 2 imply
SRC(R) = RC(R). 
This result oers two insights. First, the requirement of stochastic stability does not work as a
selection device for recurrent classes. In addition to coalitional stability as captured by the concept
of a recurrent class, stochastic stability also incorporates a notion of coalitional accessibility (i.e., it
compares the number of mistakes needed to reach an allocation in a certain recurrent class from all
other recurrent classes) as captured in the stochastic potential. However, this notion of accessibility
is rather limited as it only values the existence of least resistance trees, but e.g., not their number
(see the dierent stability and accessibility features of allocations x2 and x3 in Example 3). In
fact, Theorem 2 shows that this accessibility notion is too weak to distinguish between dierent
recurrent classes.
14Second, Theorem 2(ii) indicates that the selective power of stochastic stability as established
by Serrano and Volij (2008) does not carry over to multiple-type housing markets with strict
preferences { unlike one could have conjectured.
However, the stochastic stability of all recurrent classes is not robust towards modications
of the recontracting process. While Assumption 1 is typically satised by d.r. processes in the
literature, some papers propose alternatives to Assumptions 2, 3, and 4. These alternatives may
result in recurrent classes that fail to be stochastically stable as we discuss in the following two
subsections.
5.1.1 Modifying Assumption 3
For S  N we denote by  S  N n S the complement set of S.
For the proof of Theorem 2 it is important that there is a path between any two individually
rational allocations with at most one mistake (see Claim 1 in the proof of Theorem 2). Suppose
the d.r. process is in allocation x(t)  x 2 IR(R)nfeg. Then, there is an agent i with xi 6= ei. Now
suppose fig is the active coalition and i makes a mistake asking for his initial endowment. For
 S = Nnfig, x S is not feasible and Assumption 3 implies that x(t + 1) = e. Furthermore, e can
be blocked by any individually rational allocation without mistake. Hence, there is a path between
any two individually rational allocations with at most one mistake. Clearly, this result hinges upon
the assumption that all agents are assigned to their initial endowment if x S(t) is not feasible for
 S. Suppose we modify Assumption 3 as follows. We call a set S0   S unaected by a blocking
of coalition S if x(t)S0 is feasible for S0. Let  S be the union of all sets that are unaected by a
blocking of coalition S.
Assumption 3'. Allocations Resulting from Recontracting
Let S be the active coalition in period t. If BS(x(t)) = ;, then x(t + 1) = x(t). Let yS 2 BS(x(t))
be the blocking chosen by S. Then, xS(t + 1) = yS, x S(t + 1) = x S(t), and x Sn S(t + 1) = e Sn S.
According to Assumption 3', sub-coalitions of the complement of a blocking coalition that are
unaected by the blocking do not change their bundles (e.g., Kawasaki, 2010).
If n  3 { as it is the case in all our examples { this modication of Assumption 3 does not alter
our results. A strict sub-coalition of the complement of a blocking coalition can not contain more
than one agent in this case. If this agent is unaected by a blocking he receives his endowment in
both allocations x(t) and x(t+1). For n > 3, however, Theorem 2 no longer holds as the following
example demonstrates.





The set IR(R) of individually rational allocations is fx1;x2;x3;x4;x5g, with
x1 = f(1;1);(2;2);(3;3);(4;4)g, x2 = f(2;2);(1;1);(4;4);(3;3)g,
x3 = f(3;4);(4;3);(2;1);(1;2)g, x4 = f(1;1);(2;2);(4;4);(3;3)g,
x5 = f(2;2);(1;1);(3;3);(4;4)g.
15Furthermore, Core(R) = fx2;x3g and RC(R) = ffx2g;fx3gg:
Observe that r(x1;x2) = r(x4;x2) = r(x5;x2) = 0. Now suppose that x(t) = x3 and agent 1
(by mistake) asks for his initial endowment. Then, there is no subset S0 of  f1g for which x3
S0 is
feasible such that the resulting allocation is x1. Hence, r(x3;x1) = 1 such that a least resistance
x2-tree (e.g., f[x1;x2];[x4;x2];[x5;x2];[x3;x1]g) needs only one mistake, and (x2) = 1. In contrast,
(x3) > 1. To see this, suppose that (x3)  1. With r(x2;x1) = 2, r(x2;x3) = 2, r(x2;x4) = 1,
and r(x2;x5) = 1 it follows that there is an edge from x2 to either x4 or x5 on every least resistance
x2-tree. But as r(x4;x1) = r(x5;x1) = r(x4;x3) = r(x5;x3) = 1, there is more than one mistake on
any x3-tree in contradiction to the assumption that (x3)  1. Hence, (x3) > 1, x3 = 2 SRC(R),
and therefore fx2g = SRC(R) ( RC(R). 
As illustrated by Example 6, stochastic stability may select among recurrent classes under As-
sumption 3' when n > 3. However, stochastic stability does not necessarily select among recurrent
classes for n > 3 and there may be multiple stochastically stable recurrent classes as the following
example shows.





The set IR(R) of individually rational allocations is fx1;x2;x3g, with
x1 = f(1;1);(2;2);(3;3);(4;4)g, x2 = f(2;3);(3;1);(1;2);(4;4)g,
x3 = f(3;4);(4;3);(2;1);(1;2)g.
Furthermore, Core(R) = fx2;x3g and RC(R) = ffx2g;fx3gg.
To see that (x2) = (x3), observe that r(x1;x2) = r(x1;x3) = 0 as x2 and x3 are individually
rational. Moreover, x2 and x3 can be blocked by agent 1 who (by mistake) asks for his initial
endowment and as x2
S0 and x3
S0 are not feasible for any set S0  Nnf1g the resulting allocation is x1
and r(x2;x1) = r(x3;x1) = 1. Hence, there is a least resistance x2-tree (e.g., f[x1;x2];[x3;x1]g) and
a least resistance x3-tree (e.g., f[x1;x3];[x2;x1]g) with one mistake such that (x2) = (x3) = 1
and fx2;x3g = SRC(R) = RC(R). 
5.1.2 Modifying Assumptions 2 and 4
Considering weak recontracting (i.e., a d.r. process based on weak blocking), as introduced in
Assumptions 2 and 4, implies that members of a blocking coalition who receive the same bundle
before and after the blocking do not make a mistake. Hence, the stochastic potential and thereby
stochastic stability does not discriminate between transitions that leave some agents indierent and
transitions that make all agents strictly better o. To demonstrate the impact of this assumption,
we discuss a version of our model with strong recontracting (i.e., a d.r. process based on strong
blocking) as introduced in Serrano and Volij (2008, Section 2).
For each S  N, and each x 2 X, let Bs
S(x) = fyS 2 XS : for each i 2 S;yi Pi xig be the set of
strong S-blockings of x.
16Assumption 2'. Strong Recontracting Behavior
Given x(t), an active coalition S  N recontracts if Bs
S(x(t)) 6= ;. If jBs
S(x(t))j > 1, then each
yS 2 Bs
S(x(t)) is chosen with positive probability.
Under Assumption 2', a transition between two allocations x and x0 occurs without mistake only
if all agents in the active coalition S strictly prefer their assignment under x0 to their assignment
under x. Hence, a p.d.r. process can allow for agents that (by mistake) agree on a blocking that
leaves them indierent and agents that agree on a blocking that makes them strictly worse o. We
follow Serrano and Volij (2008, Section 2.3) and consider the following strong recontracting version
of Assumption 4.
Assumption 4'. Mistakes
The probability with which a member of an active coalition i 2 S agrees on a reallocation yS with
xi(t) Pi yi Ri ei equals  > 0 with  > 1. The probability with which a member of an active
coalition i 2 S agrees on a reallocation yS with xi(t) Ii yi Ri ei equals  > 0.
According to Assumption 4', the resistance of a transition from an allocation x to an allocation
x0 for an active coalition S is given by n(S;x;x0) = jfi 2 S : xi Pi x0
igj + jfi 2 S : xi Ii x0
igj, where
 > 1 is the weight given to mistakes that make an agent strictly worse o.
The following analysis of Example 4 using Assumptions 2' and 4' instead of Assumptions 2 and
4 shows that using strong instead of weak recontracting may enlarge the set of recurrent classes
and may produce recurrent classes that are not stochastically stable.
Example 4 (strong recontracting). SRC(R) ( RC(R)
Observe that RC(R) = ffx2g;fx3g;fx4gg. The dierent singleton recurrent classes are also the
elements of the weak core.13 Note that for a d.r. process based on weak recontracting, only fx3g and
fx4g (i.e., the elements of the core) are recurrent classes. For the construction of least resistance
trees observe that r(x3;x)   for all x 2 IR(R)nfx3g, r(x4;x)   for all x 2 IR(R)nfx4g,
and r(x1;x) = 0 for all x 2 IR(R)nfx1g. Moreover, r(x3;x1) =  (x1 f1g-blocks x3 with a
mistake weighted with ), r(x4;x1) =  (x1 f1g-blocks x4 with a mistake weighted with ), and
r(x2;x3) = 1 (x3 N-blocks x2 with agent 2 being indierent). Hence, f[x2;x3];[x3;x1];[x1;x4]g
is a least resistance x4-tree and f[x2;x3];[x4;x1];[x1;x3]g is a least resistance x3-tree such that
(x3) = (x4) = +1. In contrast, f[x4;x1];[x3;x1];[x1;x2]g is a least resistance x2-tree such that
(x2) = 2 >  + 1. Hence, SRC(R) = fx3;x4g ( fx2;x3;x4g = RC(R). 
The analysis of Example 4 illustrates that the set of stochastically stable allocations of a d.r. pro-
cess based on strong recontracting can be multi-valued. The following analysis of Example 2 based
on strong recontracting shows that singleton as well as non-singleton recurrent classes can be
stochastically stable.
Example 2 (strong recontracting). SRC(R) = RC(R)
Observe that RC(R) = ffx2;x3;x4g;fx5gg (with x5 being the only allocation in the weak and the
strong core and fx2;x3;x4g being a non-singleton recurrent class). For the construction of least
resistance trees observe that r(x1;x) = 0 and r(x;x1) =  for all x 2 IR(R)nfx1g. Moreover,
r(x;x5) =  and r(x5;x) =  for all x 2 fx2;x3;x4g. Hence, f[x2;x3];[x3;x4];[x4;x1];[x1;x5]g is a
13It is easy to see that an allocation in the weak core always corresponds to a singleton recurrent class of the
d.r. process based on strong recontracting.
17least resistance x5-tree and f[x5;x1];[x1;x3];[x3;x4];[x4;x2]g is a least resistance x2-tree such that
(x5) = (x2) = . Hence, SRC(R) = fx2;x3;x4;x5g = RC(R): 
To summarize Subsections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2, for a modied d.r. process, stochastic stability may
select among recurrent classes. However, the set of stochastically stable states can still be multi-
valued and may contain core as well as non-core allocations. This motivates the search for a solution
concept that can deliver sharper predictions on allocations that will be visited by the process in the
long-run. In the following subsection, we analyze the limit invariant distribution which captures
not only the number of mistakes needed to switch between recurrent classes but also accounts for
details of the stability and accessibility of an allocation.
5.2 The Limit Invariant Distribution
So far we have oered a method to identify the set of stochastically stable allocations SRC(R),
i.e., the support of the limit invariant distribution  = lim!0 . To assess the actual probability
(x) that the p.d.r. process will be at allocation x in the long run and for vanishing probability of
mistakes, the next theorem presents a closed form representation of  that makes explicit use of
the polynomial structure of M(x0;x00) =
P
k=0;:::;n mk(x0;x00)k. For further reference we dene a
least resistance transition e m(x0;x00) as the component mk(x0;x00) > 0 that minimizes k (i.e., for any
two allocations x0 and x00, e m(x0;x00) depicts the respective transition probability with the smallest
possible number of mistakes).







[x0;x00]2T r(x0;x00)=(x)g[[x0;x00]2T e m(x0;x00)].
Proof. Freidlin and Wentzell (1998, Chapter 6, Lemma 3.1) show that the (unique) invari-





T2Tx [x0;x00]2TM(x0;x00). If the Markov process is a p.d.r. process (X;M(R)) such
that M(x0;x00) =
P
k=0;:::;n mk(x0;x00)k, q(x) is a polynomial of degree n(jXj   1) in the mistake
probability  (there can be only one mistake per agent per edge, and there are (jXj   1) edges in
any x-tree), i.e., we can rewrite q(x) 
P
k=0;:::;n(jXj 1) qk(x)k.
By Theorem 2(ii), lim!0 q(x) > 0 if and only if x 2 RC(R). Moreover, for all k < (x),
qk(x) = 0 and q(x)(x) > 0 (by the denition of the stochastic potential, there are no x-trees with
less than (x) mistakes).




[x0;x00]2T r(x0;x00)=(x)g [x0;x00]2T e m(x0;x00) { a contribution
to q(x) of lowest order in  is given by the sum over least resistance trees.
Let jRC(R)j = 1. Then, for all x 2 RC(R), lim!0 q(x) = q0(x) > 0 and (x) = lim!0 (x) =
q0(x) P
y2RC(R) q0(y) with q0(x) =
P
fT2Txj[x0;x00]2Tr(x0;x00)=0g [x0;x00]2Tm0(x0;x00). Since (x) = 0, q0(x) =
p(x):
Let jRC(R)j  2. Recall that for all x 2 X and k < (x), qk(x) = 0, and for all x 2 RC(R),
q(x)(x) > 0. Then, for all x 2 X and j 2 f0;:::;((x)   1)g, lim!0
@jq(x)
@j = 0. Moreover,
lim!0
@(x)q(x)
@(x) = ((x)!)q(x)(x). Then, iterated application of l'Hospital's rule implies
(x) = lim!0 (x) = lim!0
q(x) P










18Computation: Theorem 3 oers the following procedure to compute (x) for x 2 RC(R).
1. Construct all least-resistance x-trees (i.e., determine fT 2 Tx j
P
[x0;x00]2T r(x0;x00) = (x)g).
By Theorem 2(i), this amounts to a construction of all trees of resistance jRC(R)j   1. We
proceed in three steps:
(a) List all recurrent classes A 2 RC(R) and determine all edges from elements of A to
elements of XnA with one mistake.14
(b) List all edges with zero mistakes.
(c) Compose all x-trees with edges listed under (a) and (b).
2. Compute the product of transition probabilities of all edges in a given least-resistance x-tree
T, i.e., [x0;x00]2T e m(x0;x00).
3. Sum over all least resistance x-trees.
As the limit invariant distribution (x) captures the long-run probability that the d.r. process
is found in state x, it is sensitive to the probability with which x is reached from and left towards
any other state. This is captured by the analytical formula provided in Freidlin and Wentzell (1998,
Chapter 6, Lemma 3.1) that requires the construction of all x-trees for a computation of (x).
According to Theorem 3 it suces to construct all least resistance x-trees for a computation of (x)
in our model. Admittedly, the resulting \computation recipe" still is of considerable computational
complexity { in particular for economies with many agents and/or a large number of recurrent
classes. It consists of an inspection of M(R)(x0;x00) for all x0;x00 2 X to determine all transitions
with zero or one mistake that could possibly be part of a least resistance tree and a construction
of all least resistance trees. As a result, any single transition probability between two states with
zero or one mistake that is part of a least resistance tree (i.e., the probability of a certain coalition
forming in a certain state and the agreement upon a certain blocking) in general has inuence on
the limit invariant distribution.
With the following analysis of some of our examples, we want to illustrate the computational
method and explain how transitions of the d.r. process into and out of recurrent classes shape the
limit invariant distribution. To this end, we dene the (relative) accessibility and stability of a
recurrent allocation as follows. Consider two recurrent classes A1;A2 2 RC(R) and allocations
x1 2 A1 and x2 2 A2. Then, x1 is more accessible from x 2 IR(R)n(A1 [ A2) than x2 if either (i)
[r(x;x2) > r(x;x1)] or (ii) [r(x;x2) = r(x;x1) and e m(x;x1) > e m(x;x2)], i.e., x1 is more accessible
from x than x2 if the d.r. process is more likely to enter x1 from x than x2 at lowest order in
the number of mistakes. Likewise, x1 is more stable towards x 2 IR(R)n(A1 [ A2) than x2 if
either (i) [r(x1;x) > r(x2;x)] or (ii) [r(x1;x) = r(x2;x) and e m(x2;x) > e m(x1;x)], i.e., x1 is more
stable towards x than x2 if the d.r. process is more likely to enter x from x2 than from x1 at
lowest order in the number of mistakes. Finally, x1 is relatively more accessible than x2 if either (i)
[r(x1;x2) > r(x2;x1)] or (ii) [r(x1;x2) = r(x2;x1) and e m(x2;x1) > e m(x1;x2)], i.e., x1 is relatively
more accessible than x2 if the d.r. process is more likely to enter x1 from x2 than to enter x2
from x1.
Example 4 (continued). Multiple Core Allocations
Construction of Least Resistance Trees: By Theorem 2, (x3) = (x4) = 1.
14By construction, any edge from an element of A to XnA needs at least one mistake. By Theorem 2(i), any such
edge in a least resistance tree must not have more than one mistake.
19(a) RC(R) = ffx3g;fx4gg. There are two types of edges from x3 to Xnfx3g. Either x4 f1;2;3g-
blocks x3 (with a mistake by agent 2) or a singleton coalition blocks by mistake via x1.
Similarly, there are two types of edges from x4 to Xnfx4g. Either x3 f1;2;3g-blocks x4 (with
a mistake by agent 1) or a singleton coalition blocks by mistake via x1.
(b) The only edges with zero mistakes are from x1 to any other individually rational allocation
and from x2 to x3 (all through an agreement of the grand coalition).
(c) Figure 1 depicts the three dierent types of x3-least resistance trees. Two more trees can
be constructed by connecting x1 with x2 or x4, respectively, instead of connecting it with x3
in the left tree. Figure 2 depicts the two dierent types of x4-trees. Two more trees can be
constructed by connecting x1 with x2 or x3, respectively, instead of connecting it with x4 in
the left tree. Because x3 can f1;2;3g-block x2 with no mistake, but x4 cannot, there is no








































Figure 2: Least Resistance x4-trees in Example 4
Computation of the Limit Invariant Distribution: By Theorem 3,
(x3)
e m(x2;x3) = e m(x4;x3)(e m(x1;x2)+ e m(x1;x3)+ e m(x1;x4))+ e m(x4;x1)(e m(x1;x3)+ e m(x1;x2)); and
(x4)
e m(x2;x3) = e m(x3;x4)(e m(x1;x2) + e m(x1;x3) + e m(x1;x4)) + e m(x3;x1)e m(x1;x4):
By Assumption 4, the probability to make a mistake does not depend on the identity of the
agent. Now suppose that the probability for a certain coalition to form does not depend on the
20current allocation. Then, e m(x3;x4) = e m(x4;x3) and e m(x3;x1) = e m(x4;x1). Finally, suppose that
a coalition agrees upon each improvement with the same probability, i.e., e m(x1;x3) = e m(x1;x4).
Then, (x3) > (x4) and the process is more likely to be found at allocation x3 then at x4 in the
long-run.
Observe that this result is driven by the fact that x3 can f1;2;3g-block x2 without mistake while
x4 cannot, i.e., x3 is more accessible from x2 than x4. If the probability for a certain coalition to form
does not depend on the current allocation and any coalition agrees upon each improvement with the
same probability, x3 and x4 do not dier in their accessibility from and stability towards the other
individually rational allocation x1 and their stability towards x2, or their relative accessibility.15
Hence, the mistake-free edge between x2 and x3 is the only asymmetry between x3 and x4 and
thereby yields a larger set of least resistance x3-trees and enhances the respective component in
the limit invariant distribution. 
This example shows that the various core (Walrasian) allocations of a multiple-type housing
market are not necessarily nal allocations of the d.r. process with the same probability. Ac-
cordingly, one may wonder whether Walrasian allocations are more likely nal allocations than
non-Walrasian core allocations, and whether recurrent allocations are more likely nal allocations
than non-core recurrent allocations. To elaborate on the rst issue, we reconsider Example 3.
Example 3 (continued). SRC(R) = RC(R) = Core(R) ) W(R)
Observe that a direct edge from x2 to x3 takes two mistakes while all other transitions from one
core allocation to another need only one mistake. Hence, x2 is relatively more accessible than x3,
x2 is more stable towards x3 than x4, and x4 is more accessible from x2 than x3. In Appendix A
we demonstrate that these are the only dierences in the (relative) accessibility and stability of the
three core allocations and that indeed (x2) > (x4) > (x3) if the probability that a certain
coalition becomes active does not depend on the allocation and a given coalition agrees upon each
improvement with the same probability. Then, x2 is the most accessible and stable allocation while
x3, the (unique) Walrasian allocation, is the worst prediction { among all recurrent allocations {
for the long-run behavior of the d.r. process. 
Finally, we demonstrate by the following example that cycles of individually rational (non-core)
allocations can be more likely nal allocations of the d.r. process than core allocations.
Example 2 (continued). SRC(R) = RC(R) ! Core(R)
Construction of Least Resistance Trees: By Theorem 2, (x2) = (x3) = (x4) = (x5) = 1.
(a) RC(R) = ffx2;x3;x4g;fx5gg. There are two types of edges from an element of fx2;x3;x4g to
Xnfx2;x3;x4g. Either, x5 f1;2;3g-blocks an element of fx2;x3;x4g with one agent making a
mistake or x1 blocks an element of fx2;x3;x4g with a singleton coalition making a mistake.
Similarly, there are two types of edges from x5 to an element of Xnfx5g. Either an element of
fx2;x3;x4g blocks x5 via a coalition of two agents with one agent making a mistake (e.g., x2
f2;3g-blocks x5 if agent 2 makes a mistake) or x1 blocks x5 with a singleton coalition making
a mistake.
15This follows directly from the edge resistances as analyzed in Steps 1(a) and (b) (Construction of Least Resistance
Trees) and the discussion of transition probabilities in Step 2 (Computation of the Limit Invariant Distribution) of
the computation method. A more detailed discussion of the (relative) accessibility and stability of recurrent classes
for this example can be found in Appendix A.
21(b) The only edges with zero mistakes are from x1 to x5 (through an agreement of the grand
coalition) and from x1 to any element of fx2;x3;x4g (through an agreement of the grand
coalition or a particular coalition of two agents, e.g., x2 f2;3g and f1;2;3g-blocks x1).
(c) Figure 3 depicts the two dierent types of x5-least resistance trees. In total, there are 12
trees of Type (a) and 3 trees of Type (b) (to see this consider the dierent permutations
of elements of fx2;x3;x4g and the dierent edges to connect x1). Figure 4 depicts the two
dierent types of x2-trees (x3 and x4-trees look identical and only dier in the respective
active coalitions). In total, there are 12 trees of Type (a) and 3 trees of Type (b). A complete



















































Figure 4: Least Resistance x2-trees
Computation of the Limit Invariant Distribution: In contrast to Example 4 (see above), the number
of least resistance x2- and x5-trees is identical. However, the respective edges represent dierent
transition probabilities. In the following, we present an informal discussion of the relevant eects
{ a complete computation is worked out in Appendix A.
22To start out, observe that x2- and x5-trees dier in three respects. First, any least resistance
x5-tree of Type (a) in Figure 3 contains a blocking of a cycle allocation by the grand coalition to
reach x5, while x2-trees of Type (a) in Figure 4 need a respective blocking of x5 by a coalition of
two agents. If the probability that the grand coalition is chosen equals the probability that any
coalition with two agents is chosen, this dierence does not matter and x5 (x2) is not relatively
more accessible than x2 (x5). Second, any least resistance x5-tree of Type (b) in Figure 3 contains
a blocking of a cycle allocation by a singleton coalition to reach x1 (by mistake), while x2-trees
of Type (b) in Figure 4 need a respective blocking of x5. However, in every cycle allocation one
of the agents is already at his endowment such that the process cannot transit to x1 with this
agent making a mistake. Hence, e m(x5;x1) > e m(x2;x1) if the probability that a certain singleton
coalition forms does not depend on the allocation and x2 is more stable towards x1 than x5. This
leads to a larger contribution from this type of trees to (x2) than to (x5). Third, x5-trees
of type (b) in Figure 3 contain a blocking of x1 by x5, while x2-trees of type (b) in Figure 4
contain a blocking of x1 by x2. While the former blocking can only be agreed upon by the grand
coalition, the latter can also be achieved by f2;3g. Hence, e m(x1;x2) > e m(x1;x5) if a coalition
agrees upon every blocking with the same probability and x2 is more accessible from x1 than x5. In
Appendix A we prove that indeed (x2) > (x5) if e m(x;x1) < e m(x5;x1) for every x 2 fx2;x3;x4g,
e m(x1;x2) > e m(x1;x5), and coalitions of size three form with the same probability as coalitions of
size two.16 Hence, the probability that the process is found in one cycle allocation is higher than
the respective probability to nd it in the core. Note, however, that this result is not driven by
the lack of mistake-free edges that lead to the core allocation x5 (as in the previous examples), but
by dierent transition probabilities for a given number of mistakes that yield dierent accessibility
and stability of the core and the cycle allocation. 
The above-mentioned examples highlight the following features of the limit invariant distribu-
tion. First, the probability that a dynamic recontracting process is in a certain recurrent class does
not depend on its topology (singleton or cycle). Neither is it necessarily enhanced by the fact that
a certain allocation is in the core or Walrasian. The weight in the limit invariant distribution of a
recurrent allocation x relative to a recurrent allocation x0 rather depends on three issues: (i) The
accessibility of x compared to x0 from other individually rational allocations. An example is the
dierent accessibility of allocations x3 and x4 from x2 in Example 4 or the accessibility of x2 and
x5 from x1 in Example 2. (ii) The stability of x compared to x0 towards other individually rational
allocations. An example is the dierent stability of allocations x2 and x4 towards x3 in Example 3.
And (iii) the relative accessibility of x and x0. An example is the relative accessibility of allocations
x2 and x3 in Example 3 or the relative accessibility of x2 and x5 in Example 2. Notably, the (rel-
ative) accessibility and stability is not only determined by asymmetries in the number of mistakes
(as, for instance, between the transitions from x2 to x3 and x4, respectively, in Example 4) but also
by asymmetries in transition probabilities for a given number of mistakes (as, for instance, in the
transitions between x2 and x5 in Example 2).
6 Concluding Remarks
Recurrent Classes: We rst model economic interaction in multiple-type housing markets by
an unperturbed dynamic recontracting process. Then, an obvious solution concept for any given






4) under these conditions.
23multiple-type housing market R is its set of recurrent classes RC(R) and the set of recurrent
allocations RC(R). The set of recurrent classes of the dynamic recontracting process is non-empty
and contains all sets of allocations that cannot be blocked by any allocation outside the respective
recurrent class. Every element of the core forms a singleton recurrent class. Moreover, non-singleton
recurrent classes exist (in settings with an empty core as well as vis-a-vis a non-empty core).
Stochastically Stable Allocations: Next, we allow agents to make mistakes and model economic
interaction in multiple-type housing markets by a perturbed dynamic recontracting process. The
second non-empty solution concepts for any given multiple-type housing market R then is its set of
stochastically stable allocations SRC(R). If the perturbation of the dynamic recontracting process
through mistakes becomes suciently small (by letting mistake probabilities converge to zero), the
process will { in the long-run { converge to a non-empty subset of the set of recurrent allocations
(the set of stochastically stable allocations). We show that every recurrent class is stochastically
stable.
Limit Invariant Distributions: Finally, to better understand which allocations are likely to be
nal allocations of our dynamic process of trade, we introduce a method to directly access the limit
invariant distribution. By construction, the limit invariant distribution  of a dynamic recontract-
ing process is the unique probability distribution over allocations that the dynamic recontracting
process will converge to in the long-run. By considering the complete set of least resistance trees
in the computation of the limit invariant distribution, the accessibility and stability of recurrent
allocations is better captured than by a stochastic stability analysis (as illustrated in several exam-
ples). However, the extra information obtained clearly comes at the cost of having to compute all
least resistance trees (compared to the construction of one tree for a stochastic stability analysis).
Since any least resistance tree only consists of resistance-minimizing edges, this boils down to a
combinatorial exercise (as also demonstrated in several examples).
Calculating the Limit Invariant Distribution: Apart from our analysis of dynamic recon-
tracting processes for multiple-type housing markets, our paper also aims at an illustration of the
method to compute the limit invariant distribution. The particular features of multiple-type hous-
ing markets proved useful to demonstrate its applicability and intuitive appeal. However, results
similar to Theorem 3 are also feasible and desirable for other Markov processes, for instance for
non-cooperative games or social and economic network formation.
Conclusion: Our analysis has shown that neither the core nor Walrasian allocations might be
good predictors for dynamic recontracting processes. We have seen some instances where a cycle
of allocations may be the best predictor for the nal allocation of our dynamic trading process.
Clearly, this conclusion is in part driven by the myopia of agents. Recall that in each period agents
agree to trade if it is benecial to do so. In accepting such trades, agents do not envision the
possible blockings along the trading path. Nevertheless, it is clear from our analysis that there
are aspects of stability and in particular of accessibility of allocations that are not captured by the
core. Some core allocations turn out to be harder to reach than others while non-core allocations
may emerge naturally through a sequence of trades. This indicates that modeling the dynamics of
recontracting only implicitly by a cooperative solution concept as the core is inappropriate (even








and IR(R) = fx1;x2;x3;x4g with
x1 = f(1;1);(2;2);(3;3)g, x2 = f(1;1);(3;2);(2;3)g, x3 = f(1;2);(2;1);(3;3)g,
x4 = f(3;1);(2;2);(1;3)g.
Hence, Core(R) = W(R) = ;. Furthermore, RC(R) = SRC(R) = fx2;x3;x4g. 




and IR(R) = fx1;x2;x3;x4;x5g with
x1 = f(1;1);(2;2);(3;3)g, x2 = f(1;1);(3;2);(2;3)g, x3 = f(1;2);(2;1);(3;3)g,
x4 = f(3;1);(2;2);(1;3)g, x5 = f(2;2);(3;3);(1;1)g.
Clearly, x2 f2;3g-blocks x1, x3 f1;2g-blocks x2, x4 f1;3g-blocks x3, and x2 f2;3g-blocks x4. Since
x5 cannot be blocked by any coalition, Core(R) = fx5g.
Next, we prove that allocation x5 is Walrasian. It is easy to check that the following
(in)equalities hold, e.g., for price system p  (p1;p2) such that p1 = (0;1; 1
2) and p2 = (1;0; 1
2):
(1) p1(1) + p2(1) = p1(2) + p2(2), (2) p1(2) + p2(2) = p1(3) + p2(3),
(3) p1(3) + p2(3) = p1(1) + p2(1), (4) p1(3) + p2(1) > p1(1) + p2(1),
(5) p1(2) + p2(1) > p1(2) + p2(2), (6) p1(2) + p2(3) > p1(3) + p2(3).




To compute the limit invariant distribution, we proceed as indicated in Section 5.2.
Construction of Least Resistance Trees: By Theorem 2, (x5) = (x2) = (x3) = (x4) = 1.
(a) RC(R) = ffx2;x3;x4g;fx5gg. The following table lists the coalitions that facilitate a tran-
sition from an initial state (row) to a nal state (column) with one mistake17 (we omit the
diagonal elements as they are irrelevant for cycle-free graphs, moreover we do not list edges
with mistakes between allocations in fx2;x3;x4g as they can never be part of a least resistance
tree).
17The agent who makes a mistake is uniquely determined in this example.
25x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
x1 { ; ; ; ;
x2 f1g;f2g;f3g;f1;2g;f1;3g { N { N
x3 f1g;f2g;f3g;f1;3g;f2;3g { { N N
x4 f1g;f2g;f3g;f1;2g;f2;3g N { { N
x5 f1g;f2g;f3g f2;3g f1;2g f1;3g {
(b) The following table lists the coalitions that facilitate a transition from an initial state (row)
to a nal state (column) with zero mistakes.
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
x1 x N;f2;3g N;f1;2g N;f1;3g N
x2 ; { f1;2g ; ;
x3 ; ; { f1;3g ;
x4 ; f2;3g ; { ;
x5 ; ; ; ; {
(c) With the transition opportunities as depicted in the previous tables, we can now list all least
resistance trees for the (unique) core allocation x5 and a cycle allocation, for instance x2. We
start with the set of x5-trees. If every least resistance tree includes exactly one mistake (i.e.,
(x5) = 1), this mistake has to be made on a (cycle-free) sequence of edges from an element of
the cycle to x5. From any allocation in the cycle there are exactly two such paths. First, the
grand coalition forms and the agent who is worse o at allocation x5 (note that this is exactly
one agent for every allocation in the cycle) agrees upon x5 by mistake. Second, a singleton
coalition forms and the respective agent ask for his endowment even though he is then worse
o. Note that in every cycle allocation there are two such singleton allocations (e.g., at x2
only agents 2 and 3 can recontract on their endowment and thereby induce a transition to x1.
Agent 1, in contrast, is already at his endowment). These two types of paths induce the two
types of least resistance trees depicted in Figure 3. Next, observe that the allocations of the
cycle have to be connected via the respective (unique) mistake-free edges. As for type (a) note
that there are three dierent allocations from which the cycle can be left to x5. Moreover,
there can be a (mistake-free) edge from x1 to any other of the four allocations. This leaves







Likewise there are three dierent allocations in the cycle from which x1 can be reached (and
subsequently left towards x5). Hence, we have to add the following three trees.
f[x3;x4];[x4;x2];[x2;x1];[x1;x5]g; f[x2;x3];[x3;x4];[x4;x1];[x1;x5]g;
f[x4;x2];[x2;x3];[x3;x1];[x1;x5]g.
26In a similar way, we can construct the set of x2-trees. If every least resistance tree includes
exactly one mistake (i.e., (x2) = 1), this mistake has to be made on a (cycle-free) sequence
of edges from x5 to an element of the cycle. To any allocation in the cycle there are two such
paths. Either, a particular coalition of size two forms and the agent who is worse o at the
cycle-allocation agrees upon the cycle allocation by mistake. Note that there is exactly one
coalition of size two that can actually contract upon each cycle allocation (the agent who is
left at his endowment can not be a member of such a coalition). Second, one of the three
singleton coalition forms and the respective agent asks for his endowment even though he is
then worse o, afterwards the grand coalition or f2;3g agree upon x2. These two types of
paths induce the two types of least resistance trees depicted in Figure 4 (again the allocations
of the cycle have to be connected via the respective (unique) mistake-free edges). As for type
(a) note that there are three dierent allocations from which the cycle can be accessed from
x5. Moreover, there can be a (mistake-free) edge from x1 to any other of the four allocation.







Likewise there are three dierent allocations in the cycle that can be reached from x1 (after
x5 has been left towards x1). Hence, we have to add the following three trees.
f[x3;x4];[x4;x2];[x1;x2];[x5;x1]g; f[x2;x3];[x3;x4];[x1;x4];[x5;x1]g;
f[x4;x2];[x2;x3];[x1;x3];[x5;x1]g.
Computation of the Limit Invariant Distribution: This is sucient information to apply the formula
for  in Theorem 3. For expositional ease let us make the following assumptions. First, recall
from Assumption 4 that the probability for an agent to commit a mistake does not depend on his
identity, the coalition, or the allocation. Moreover, suppose the probability that a certain coalition
forms does not depend on the identity of the agents and that a coalition chooses each improving
allocation with the same probability. Then,
e m(x2;x3) = e m(x3;x4) = e m(x4;x2);
e m(x1;x2) = e m(x1;x3) = e m(x1;x4);
e m(x2;x1) = e m(x3;x1) = e m(x4;x1);
e m(x2;x5) = e m(x3;x5) = e m(x4;x5);





9e m(x2;x5)e m(x1;x2) + 3e m(x1;x5)e m(x2;x5) + 3e m(x1;x5)e m(x2;x1)
9e m(x5;x2)e m(x1;x2) + 3e m(x1;x5)e m(x5;x2) + 3e m(x5;x1)e m(x1;x2)
:
27By checking the relations e m(x2;x5)=e m(x5;x2), e m(x1;x5)=e m(x1;x2), and e m(x2;x1)=e m(x5;x1) we
determine the ratio of (x5) and (x2).
e m(x2;x5)=e m(x5;x2): recall from the second table (see above) that a least resistance edge from
x2 to x5 needs the grand coalition to form and agent 3 making a mistake, while the least resistance
edge from x5 to x2 needs the coalition f2;3g to form and agent 2 making a mistake. Suppose
coalitions of size two and size three form with the same probability, then e m(x2;x5) = e m(x5;x2).
e m(x1;x5)=e m(x1;x2): recall from the rst table (see above) that x2 can be recontracted upon
at x1 by the grand coalition and f2;3g, while the grand coalition is needed to agree upon x5. If
all improving allocations are chosen from a coalition with the same probability, we therefore get
e m(x1;x5) < e m(x1;x2).
e m(x2;x1)=e m(x5;x1): the above conditions also ensure that e m(x2;x1) < e m(x5;x1).
Hence, (x2) > (x5). Finally the symmetry of the preferences with respect to a permutation
of allocations x2, x3, and x4 implies that (x2) = (x3) = (x4) whenever coalition formation
does not depend on allocations and the identity of the agents. 




and IR(R) = fx1;x2;x3;x4g with
x1 = f(1;1);(2;2);(3;3)g, x2 = f(2;3);(1;2);(3;1)g, x3 = f(1;2);(3;3);(2;1)g,
x4 = f(3;3);(1;2);(2;1)g.
Clearly, x2 f1;2;3g-blocks x1. Since x2, x3, and x4 cannot be blocked by any coalition, Core(R) =
fx2;x3;x4g. Next, we check if any of the core allocations is Walrasian.
Allocation x2 is not Walrasian. If it was, then the following (in)equalities would hold:
(1) p1(1) + p2(1) = p1(2) + p2(3), (2) p1(2) + p2(2) = p1(1) + p2(2),
(3) p1(3) + p2(3) = p1(3) + p2(1), (4) p1(3) + p2(3) > p1(1) + p2(1),
(5) p1(1) + p2(2) > p1(1) + p2(1), (6) p1(1) + p2(3) > p1(2) + p2(2).
By (2) and (6), we obtain p1(1)+p2(3) > p1(1)+p2(2). Thus, p2(3) > p2(2). By (5), p2(2) > p2(1)
and by (3), p2(1) = p2(3). Hence, p2(3) > p2(2) > p2(1) = p2(3); a contradiction.
Allocation x3 is Walrasian. It is easy to check that the following (in)equalities hold, e.g., for
price system p  (p1;p2) such that p1 = (2; 1
2;1) and p2 = (1;1; 1
2):
(1) p1(1) + p2(1) = p1(1) + p2(2), (2) p1(2) + p2(2) = p1(3) + p2(3),
(3) p1(3) + p2(3) = p1(2) + p2(1), (4) p1(1) + p2(2) > p1(2) + p2(2),
(5) p1(1) + p2(3) > p1(2) + p2(2), (6) p1(3) + p2(1) > p1(3) + p2(3).
Allocation x4 is not Walrasian. If it was, then the following (in)equalities would hold:
28(1) p1(1) + p2(1) = p1(3) + p2(3), (2) p1(2) + p2(2) = p1(1) + p2(2),
(3) p1(3) + p2(3) = p1(2) + p2(1), (4) p1(1) + p2(2) > p1(1) + p2(1),
(5) p1(1) + p2(3) > p1(2) + p2(2), (6) p1(3) + p2(1) > p1(3) + p2(3).
By (2) and (5), we obtain p1(1)+p2(3) > p1(1)+p2(2). Thus, p2(3) > p2(2). By (4), p2(2) > p2(1)
and by (6), p2(1) > p2(3). Hence, p2(3) > p2(2) > p2(1) > p2(3); a contradiction.




To compute the limit invariant distribution, we proceed as indicated in Section 5.2.
Construction of Least Resistance Trees: By Theorem 2, (x2) = (x3) = (x4) = 2.
(a) RC(R) = ffx2g;fx3g;fx4gg. The following table lists the coalitions that facilitate a transition
from an initial state (row) to a nal state (column) with one mistake18 (we omit the diagonal
elements as they are irrelevant for cycle-free graphs).
x1 x2 x3 x4
x1 { ; ; ;
x2 f1g;f2g;f3g { ; N
x3 f1g;f2g;f3g N { N
x4 f1g;f2g;f3g N N {
The asymmetry in this example is due to the fact that it takes two mistakes for a transition
from x2 to x3 while all other transitions between core allocations need only one mistake (and
x1 can be accessed from any core allocation by one mistake of any singleton coalition).
(b) The following table lists the coalitions that facilitate a transition from an initial state (row)
to a nal state (column) with zero mistakes.
x1 x2 x3 x4
x1 { N N N
x2 ; { ; ;
x3 ; ; { ;
x4 ; ; ; {







18The agent who makes a mistake is uniquely determined in this example.
19Trees listed in one row only dier through a dierent connection of x
1. The rst three rows depict the trees with
direct edges between core allocations and all possible connections of x
1. The other trees are then constructed through






















Computation of the Limit Invariant Distribution: By Assumption 4, the probability of a mistake
does not depend on the allocation or the identity of the agent. Now suppose that the probability
for a certain coalition to become active does also not depend on the allocation. Then, e m(x2;x1) =
e m(x3;x1) = e m(x4;x1). Moreover, assume that the grand coalition agrees upon recontracting on
each core allocation with the same probability if the p.d.r. process is at x1 (i.e., e m(x1;x2) =
e m(x1;x3) = e m(x1;x4)). Finally, suppose that all transitions between core allocations that only
need one mistake have the same probability (i.e., e m(x2;x4) = e m(x3;x2) = e m(x3;x4) = e m(x4;x2) =
e m(x4;x3)). Then Theorem 3 yields
(x2) = 9e m(x1;x2)(e m(x2;x4))2 + 6e m(x2;x1)e m(x1;x2)e m(x2;x4) + e m(x1;x2)(e m(x2;x1))2
(x3) = 3e m(x1;x2)(e m(x2;x4))2 + 4e m(x2;x1)e m(x1;x2)e m(x2;x4) + e m(x1;x2)(e m(x2;x1))2
(x4) = 6e m(x1;x2)(e m(x2;x4))2 + 5e m(x2;x1)e m(x1;x2)e m(x2;x4) + e m(x1;x2)(M(x2;x1))2
which implies that (x2) > (x4) > (x3). Note in particular that the unique Walrasian
allocation x3 is the worst predictor for the long-run behavior of the process. 




and IR(R) = fx1;x2;x3;x4g with,
x1 = f(1;1);(2;2);(3;3)g, x2 = f(2;3);(1;2);(3;1)g; x3 = f(3;3);(1;2);(2;1)g,
x4 = f(1;2);(3;3);(2;1)g:
Clearly, x2 f1;2;3g-blocks x1 and x3 f1;2;3g-blocks x2. Since x3 and x4 cannot be blocked by
any coalition, Core(R) = fx3;x4g. Next, we check if any of the core allocations is Walrasian.
Allocation x3 is Walrasian. It is easy to check that the following (in)equalities hold, e.g., for
price system p  (p1;p2) such that p1 = (2;2;0) and p2 = (1;2;3):
(1) p1(1) + p2(1) = p1(3) + p2(3), (2) p1(2) + p2(2) = p1(1) + p2(2),
(3) p1(3) + p2(3) = p1(2) + p2(1), (4) p1(1) + p2(2) > p1(1) + p2(1),
(5) p1(1) + p2(3) > p1(2) + p2(2).
Allocation x4 is Walrasian. It is easy to check that the following (in)equalities hold, e.g., for
price system p  (p1;p2) such that p1 = (2;1;2) and p2 = (1;1;1):
(1) p1(1) + p2(1) = p1(3) + p2(3), (2) p1(2) + p2(2) = p1(1) + p2(2),
(3) p1(3) + p2(3) = p1(2) + p2(1), (4) p1(1) + p2(2) > p1(2) + p2(2),
(5) p1(1) + p2(3) > p1(2) + p2(2).
Hence, W(R) = fx3;x4g:
By Theorem 1(iii) only individually rational allocations can be recurrent allocations. By Theo-
rem 1(ii), fx3g and fx4g are recurrent classes. Since x3 f1;2;3g-blocks x2 and x4 f1;2;3g-blocks x1,




Accessibility and Stability: we have r(x1;x4) = r(x1;x3) = r(x2;x3) = 0, r(x2;x4) = r(x3;x4) =
r(x4;x3) = r(x3;x1) = r(x4;x1) = 1, and r(x3;x2) = r(x4;x2) = 2 (i.e., an edge from x3 or x4 to
x2 cannot be part of a least resistance tree). Moreover, if the probability for a certain coalition
to form does not depend on the current allocation and a coalition agrees upon any improvement
with the same probability, it also holds that e m(x1;x4) = e m(x1;x3), e m(x3;x1) = e m(x4;x1), and
e m(x3;x4) = e m(x4;x3) (recall that by Assumption 4, the probability to make a mistake does not
depend on the identity of the agent). Hence, x3 is more accessible from x2 than x4 and this is the
only accessibility or stability relation in this example. 




31and IR(R) = fx1;x2;x3;x4;x5g with
x1 = f(1;1);(2;2);(3;3)g, x2 = f(1;1);(3;2);(2;3)g, x3 = f(2;3);(1;2);(3;1)g,
x4 = f(3;3);(1;2);(2;1)g, x5 = f(1;2);(3;3);(2;1)g.
Clearly, x2 f2;3g-blocks x1, x2 f2;3g-blocks x4, and x2 f2;3g-blocks x5. Since x2 and x3 cannot
be blocked by any coalition, Core(R) = fx2;x3g. Next, we check if any of the core allocations is
Walrasian.
Allocation x2 is not Walrasian. If it was, then the following (in)equalities would hold:
(1) p1(2) + p2(2) = p1(3) + p2(2), (2) p1(3) + p2(3) = p1(2) + p2(3),
(3) p1(2) + p2(3) > p1(1) + p2(1), (4) p1(3) + p2(3) > p1(1) + p2(1),
(5) p1(1) + p2(2) > p1(1) + p2(1), (6) p1(3) + p2(1) > p1(3) + p2(3),
(7) p1(1) + p2(3) > p1(3) + p2(3).
By (5), p2(2) > p2(1) and by (6), p2(1) > p2(3). Hence, (8) p2(2) > p2(3).
Next, by (1), p1(2) = p1(3) and therefore, p1(3) + p2(3) = p1(2) + p2. By (7), p1(1) > p1(3) and
therefore, p1(1)+p2(1) > p1(3)+p2(1). Using the previous (in)equalities, (3) implies p1(3)+p2(3) >
p1(3) + p2(1). Hence, p2(3) > p2(1); a contradiction to (8).
Allocation x3 is not Walrasian. If it was, then the following (in)equalities would hold:
(1) p1(1) + p2(1) = p1(2) + p2(3), (2) p1(2) + p2(2) = p1(1) + p2(2),
(3) p1(3) + p2(3) = p1(3) + p2(1), (4) p1(3) + p2(3) > p1(1) + p2(1),
(5) p1(1) + p2(2) > p1(1) + p2(1), (6) p1(3) + p2(2) > p1(2) + p2(2),
(7) p1(1) + p2(3) > p1(3) + p2(3).
By (7), p1(1) > p1(3) and by (6), p1(3) > p1(2). By (2), p1(2) = p1(1). Hence, p1(1) > p1(3) >
p1(2) = p1(1); a contradiction.
Hence, W(R) = ;:
By Theorem 1(iii) only individually rational allocations can be recurrent allocations. According
to Theorem 1(ii) fx2g and fx3g are (singleton) recurrent classes. Since x2 f1;2;3g-block x1 and
x2 f2;3g-blocks x4 and x5, fx2g and fx3g are the only recurrent classes. Therefore, RC(R) =
SRC(R) = Core(R) = fx2;x3g: 
B A Short Markov Process Dictionary
 A Markov process (X;M) is determined by a discrete state space X and a mapping M :
X  X ! [0;1] where M(x;x0) describes the probability that the state equals x0 2 X in
period t+1 whenever it was in x 2 X in period t. Clearly, for all x 2 X,
P
x02X M(x;x0) = 1.
Here we restrict ourselves to nite, time-homogeneous Markov processes, i.e., X is a nite set
and transition probabilities induced (and captured in M) do not depend on time.
 A recurrent class A  X is a minimal set of states that once entered throughout the dynamic
process is never abandoned.
32 A recurrent class A is aperiodic whenever it does not contain any deterministic and non-
trivial cycle, i.e., there is no sequence of at least two states x1;x2;:::;xn 2 A such that for
all i = 1;::;n   1, xi 2 A and M(xi;xi+1) = M(xn;x1) = 1. Note that a sucient condition
for the aperiodicity of a recurrent class A is that for some x 2 A, 0 < M(x;x) < 1, i.e., the
Markov process exhibits sucient (but not complete) inertia.
 By the weak fundamental theorem of Markov processes every aperiodic recurrent class A  X
corresponds to exactly one invariant distribution  : X ! [0;1] with   M =  and support
A, i.e.,
P
x2A (x) = 1. If all recurrent classes of a Markov process are aperiodic, then its
set of invariant distributions is dened as the convex hull of the invariant distributions of
its recurrent classes. The support of an invariant distribution  of such a Markov process is
therefore a (non-empty) collection of recurrent classes.
 By the fundamental theorem of Markov processes the unique invariant distribution  that is
induced by an aperiodic recurrent class A  X describes the probability (x) that the process
will be at state x 2 A if it reached a state in A and propagated forever, i.e., for all x 2 A and
all probability distributions ~  : A ! [0;1], (x) = (limk!1 ~   Mk)(x).
 A Markov process is ergodic if it has a unique recurrent class.
 A Markov process is irreducible if it is ergodic and the recurrent class coincides with the state
space X.
 A perturbed Markov process (X;M) is a Markov process such that for all x;x0 2 X,
lim!0 M(x;x0) = M(x;x0), and for all  > 0, M(x;x0) > 0 implies that there is an r  0
with 0 < lim!0  rM(x;x0) < 1. Here we restrict ourselves to irreducible and aperiodic
perturbed Markov processes. Therefore, the invariant distribution  of (X;M) is unique.
 The limit invariant distribution  of a Markov process (X;M) is the invariant distribution
 of a perturbed process (X;M) in the limit of  ! 0. Young (1993, Theorem 4(i)) implies
that  := lim!0  exists and is an invariant distribution of (X;M).
 A state in the support of  is stochastically stable.
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